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U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services



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20**2004**

FILE:

Office: MIAMI, FLORIDA

Date:

IN RE:

Applicant:

APPLICATION:

Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under section 212(h) of the

Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h).

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

SELF-REPRESENTED

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

Robert P. Wiemann, Director Administrative Appeals Office

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DISCUSSION: The waiver application was denied by the District Director, Miami, Florida, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant is a native and citizen of Honduras who was found to be inadmissible to the United States pursuant to section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), for having been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. The applicant is the beneficiary of an approved petition for alien relative filed by his U.S. citizen spouse. The applicant seeks a waiver of inadmissibility pursuant to section 212(h) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h), so that he may remain in the United States and reside with his U.S. citizen spouse and child.

The District Director concluded that the applicant had failed to establish that extreme hardship would be imposed upon his U.S. citizen spouse. The application was denied accordingly. *See District Director's Decision* dated December 29, 2003.

On appeal the applicant submits a birth certificate for his U.S. born child, an affidavit and other documentation.

Section 212(a)(2) of the Act states in pertinent part, that:

- (A)(i) [A]ny alien convicted of, or who admits having committed, or who admits committing acts which constitute the essential elements of-
 - (I) a crime involving moral turpitude (other than a purely political offense) or an attempt or conspiracy to commit such a crime . . . is inadmissible.

Section 212(h) of the Act provides, in pertinent part, that:

- (h) The Attorney General [now the Secretary of Homeland Security, "Secretary"] may, in his discretion, waive the application of subparagraphs $(A)(i)(I)\ldots$ of subsection $(a)(2)\ldots$ if -
 - (1) (B) in the case of an immigrant who is the spouse, parent, son, or daughter of a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence if it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General [Secretary] that the alien's denial of admission would result in extreme hardship to the United States citizen or lawfully resident spouse, parent, son, or daughter of such alien

The record reflects that on May 19, 1998, in the Circuit Court in and for Dade County, Florida, the applicant was convicted for the offense of Aggravated Assault with a Deadly Weapon. The applicant is inadmissible to the United States under section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) of the Act, due to his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude.

Section 212(h) of the Act provides that a waiver of the bar to admission resulting from section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) of the Act is dependent first upon a showing that the bar imposes an extreme hardship on a qualifying family member. Once extreme hardship is established, it is but one favorable factor to be considered in the determination of whether the Secretary should exercise discretion. See Matter of Mendez, 21 I&N Dec. 296 (BIA 1996).

In the present case, the applicant must demonstrate extreme hardship to his U.S. citizen spouse or child.

Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez, 22 I&N Dec. 560 (BIA 1999) provides a list of factors the BIA deemed relevant in determining whether an alien has established extreme hardship pursuant to section 212(i) of the Act. These factors include the presence of a lawful permanent resident or United States citizen spouse or parent in this country; the qualifying relative's family ties outside the United States; the conditions in the country or countries to which the qualifying relative would relocate and the extend of the qualifying relative's ties in such countries; the financial impact of departure from this country; and significant conditions of health, particularly when tied to an unavailability of suitable medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate.

On appeal the applicant submits an affidavit and states that his spouse and child would suffer financial hardship if he is not permitted to remain in the United States. In addition the applicant states that his spouse does not work and he is the only breadwinner. Furthermore the applicant requests that he be given another chance and that his case be reconsidered so that he can become a permanent resident.

The record reflects that the applicant's spouse was employed prior to the birth of their child and was receiving a salary above the federal poverty level for a family of two. No documentary evidence was provided to show why she would not be able to work full time in order to provide for herself and her child.

The record of proceedings does not make it clear whether the applicant's spouse (Ms. and child will follow him to the Honduras if he is removed. If the applicant is removed to the Honduras his U.S. spouse and child would suffer hardship, but there is no indication that this would impact them at a level commensurate with extreme hardship. In the present case the record reflects that the applicant's spouse is a native of the Honduras, she is bilingual and no reason was provided as to why Ms. and her child would not be able to adjust to life in the Honduras if they were to relocate with the applicant.

U.S. court decisions have repeatedly held that the common results of deportation or exclusion are insufficient to prove extreme hardship. See Hassan v. INS, 927 F.2d 465, 468 (9th Cir. 1991). For example, Matter of Pilch, 21 I&N Dec. 627 (BIA 1996), held that emotional hardship caused by severing family and community ties is a common result of deportation and does not constitute extreme hardship. In addition, Perez v. INS, 96 F.3d 390 (9th Cir. 1996), held that the common results of deportation are insufficient to prove extreme hardship and defined "extreme hardship" as hardship that was unusual or beyond that which would normally be expected upon deportation. Hassan v. INS, supra, held further that the uprooting of family and separation from friends does not necessarily amount to extreme hardship but rather represents the type of inconvenience and hardship experienced by the families of most aliens being deported. The U.S. Supreme Court additionally held in INS v. Jong Ha Wang, 450 U.S. 139 (1981), that the mere showing of economic detriment to qualifying family members is insufficient to warrant a finding of extreme hardship.

A review of the documentation in the record, when considered in its totality reflects that the applicant has failed to show that his U.S. citizen spouse or child would suffer extreme hardship if he were removed from the United States. Having found the applicant statutorily ineligible for relief, no purpose would be served in discussing whether the applicant merits a waiver as a matter of discretion.

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In proceedings for application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility under section 212(h) of the Act, the burden of proving eligibility remains entirely with the applicant. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, the applicant has not met that burden. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

ORDER:

The appeal is dismissed.